Trump Won the White House
What does that mean for US foreign and illicit finance policy?
Former President Donald Trump has won the 2024 presidential election, and he will be returning to the White House on January 20, 2025.
Don’t worry, I’m not writing about the election. As I wrote in a previous piece, our elections were free, transparent, and secure, despite Russia’s best efforts to the contrary. And the efforts were voluminous.
Polling stations in Georgia (state, not country) received several “non-credible” bomb threats from Russia. Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger said the false threats disrupted voting at 12 polling places in Fulton, Gwinnett and DeKalb counties. A total of 32 bomb threats were made, but the disruptions were minimal.
A joint ODNI/FBI/CISA statement a few days ago noted increased Russian activity. The IC assessed that Russian influence actors recently posted and amplified an article falsely claiming that US officials across swing states plan to orchestrate election fraud using tactics such as ballot stuffing and cyber attacks. A bit of projection from Russia considering these are the tactics they recently used in Georgia (country, not state).
Another joint ODNI/FBI/CISA alert on 1 November assessed that Russia manufactured a recent video that falsely depicted individuals claiming to be from Haiti and voting illegally in multiple counties in Georgia. Before the agencies released that statement, Internet sleuths had already tagged the video as so much garbage. The address listed on several of the licenses of these alleged “Haitians” were nonexistent. And the agencies based their assessment on information available to the intelligence community and prior activities of other Russian influence actors, including videos and other disinformation activities.
So yes, the 2024 elections were above board. Trump is coming back to the White House, and the country is working to assess what that means.
Anti-Corruption efforts
The great Jodi Vittori, anti-corruption expert and professor at Georgetown University, wrote late last month that Trump’s supporters may erode the AML/CFT efforts the United States diligently built up over the past several years, including the Corporate Transparency Act, which, among other things, requires LLCs in the United States to disclose their beneficial owners to combat the use of anonymous entities to hide illicit assets.
…some of Trump’s backers are nonetheless aggressively advocating to undermine these efforts. Most notable are the efforts to reinstate the ability to form anonymous shell companies. Until this year, it was completely legal to form anonymous shell companies in the United States; the Corporate Transparency Act (CTA) closed this loophole.
[…]
A section of the Project 2025 document titled “Anti-Money Laundering and Beneficial Ownership Reporting Reform” goes into significant detail on plans for killing the CTA and reassessing the nation’s money laundering institutions writ large.
The Heritage Foundation had been criticizing the CTA long before it had even passed, and now that Trump is returning to the White House, will the CTA and its beneficial ownership information requirement be nixed?
Foreign Policy
Trump during his first term instituted maximum pressure campaigns against both Iran and Venezuela. Trump intensified sanctions—especially on Iran—and unilaterally exited the so-called “Iran nuclear deal” - the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Trump in November 2018 officially reimposed all sanctions against Iran. The administration also targeted Iran’s financial sector, automotive sector, commercial aircraft, and metals.
October 18, 2023 marked Iran’s “Transition Day,” when certain UN restrictions on Iran’s nuclear and missile programs were lifted under the JCPOA. The United States under Trump had already reimposed sanctions, and the UK and EU both decided to maintain designations and other restrictions despite the expiration.
The United States and its allies have been hammering Iran with sanctions based on human rights violations after the death of Mahsa Amini in September 2022 at the hands of Iran’s morality police and subsequent mass protests, which resulted in vicious repression. In addition, sanctions and trade restrictions have also been imposed on Iran for its support for Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and its funding and support of terrorist proxies in the Middle East and attacks on Israel.
The EU in October sanctioned seven individuals and seven entities following Iran’s missile and drone transfers to Russia.
The US Treasury in September 2023 targeted seven individuals and four entities based in Iran, China, Russia, and Türkiye in connection with Iran’s unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and military aircraft development.
The UK also imposed designations in coordination with the United States and Canada in response to Tehran’s attack on Israel on 13 April, targeting individuals and companies involved in Iranian drone industry and imposing restrictions on additional specific components used in drone and missile production.
Would Trump continue his maximum pressure campaign against Iran? This is a legitimate question given Russia’s close relationship with Iran and Trump’s ties with Russia. Trump in February said he would let Russia do “whatever the hell they want” to NATO allies who “didn’t pay their fair share,” whatever that means.
The NATO benchmark is spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense. It’s a guideline, not a requirement. It’s not about paying bills. It’s about how much NATO members spend on their own defense. And after Putin invaded Ukraine, NATO members have been scrambling to increase their defense spending.
When I worked the issue in 2008-2010, only a handful of NATO members reached their 2 percent of GDP target: the United States, the UK, Greece (because its GDP declined so sharply during the global financial crisis, that 2 percent was easy to attain), Poland, and Albania. The Atlantic Council this year reported that out of the thirty-two NATO allies, 23 now meet the benchmark.
The NATO Article 5 collective security guarantee is the principle of collective defense—the idea that an attack on one member is an attack on all. It has been invoked only once - after the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. The point of the collective security guarantee is that no matter what member—big or small—is attacked, the rest will engage as one team.
Trump has never understood how NATO works. He acts as if the defense spending target is some kind of membership due. It’s not.
Each member spends what they believe is necessary on their own national defense.
NATO does have some common funds, to which all members contribute.
Common funding arrangements apply to the NATO civil and military budgets, and the NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP). Together, these common-funded budgets reinforce the Alliance, providing major capabilities, enabling deterrence, defence and interoperability, and supporting consultation and decision-making at the highest levels. These are the only funds for which NATO authorities identify their funding needs in accordance with the Alliance's overarching objectives and priorities. Allied common funding contributions to NATO are established using an agreed cost-sharing formula derived from the Gross National Income of NATO member countries. Where military common funding is concerned – the military budget and the NSIP – the 'over and above' principle guides Allies' decisions. In essence, it focuses on the provision of requirements that would not be reasonable for an Ally to bear individually.
The United States contributes about 16 percent to NATO’s common funding—about the same as Germany—and as the alliance’s biggest member, that’s not too bad.
Given Trump’s threats to essentially upend the alliance, European nations need to start making plans to defend themselves against common threats, including Russia.
The EU has already been making plans to overhaul its sanctions regime against Russia in the event of Trump’s return to the White House. Given the possibility that Trump could undermine western efforts to hold Russia accountable for its aggression, Europe is working on strengthening its own sanctions regime. Reuters reported in October that the discussions in Europe are centred on several initiatives to ensure that EU sanctions would remain in place longer term instead of having to be renewed every six months, bolstering them through tighter enforcement if Trump decides to weaken the measures.
European nations are also emphasizing increased military spending and unity in case Trump decides to undermine the NATO alliance.
What about sanctions against Venezuela? Trump imposed a maximum pressure campaign of sanctions against the Maduro regime in Venezuela in hopes of ousting Nicolás Maduro.
The Trump sanctions against Venezuela are still in effect after a short period of relief provided by the Biden administration last year in hopes that Maduro would live up to his promise to hold free and fair elections. After Maduro reneged on his commitment to hold democratic election in the country, OFAC reimposed certain sanctions, reversing the relief provided in October, 2023.
Trump was fairly tough on Venezuela during his first term, but given Russia’s close relationship with Maduro, will he continue the maximum pressure campaign he began? Will he use more targeted sanctions to exert pressure on Maduro? Will he do Putin a favor and reverse course on Venezuela? It remains to be seen.
What about Ukraine?
Trump has been skeptical about continuing to support Ukraine as the country approaches its third year of fighting off a full-scale Russian invasion.
Some in Trump’s sphere have openly blamed NATO for Russia’s aggression, and Ukraine’s future seems uncertain as the President-elect bragged that he would end the war before even taking office.
Let’s just clear the air about NATO’s responsibility for Russia’s aggression toward its neighbors. It’s a load of hooey.
NATO has not been a huge source of heartburn for Russia. Putin in 2000 openly suggested that Russia could some day join the alliance. That doesn’t sound like someone concerned about NATO expansion.
In an article in the Journal of Democracy in 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion began, former US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul and associate professor of international relations at the US Military Academy, director of its international affairs curriculum, and faculty affiliate at its Modern War Institute, Robert Person wrote that Putin certainly did not oppose the Baltic states joining NATO in 2002 and certainly did not invade the smaller countries.
When NATO announced in 2002 its plan for a major (and last big) wave of expansion that would include three former Soviet republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—Putin barely reacted. He certainly did not threaten to invade any of the countries to keep them out of NATO. Asked specifically in late 2001 whether he opposed the Baltic states’ membership in NATO, he stated, “We of course are not in a position to tell people what to do. We cannot forbid people to make certain choices if they want to increase the security of their nations in a particular way.”
Note Putin’s quote there.
But all of a sudden NATO is responsible for Putin’s decision to attack its neighbor? Nope.
It’s tough to say whether Trump buys NATO expansion as an excuse for Russia’s invasion. It’s tough to say whether Trump will continue to support Ukraine once he returns to the White House.
Ukrainian president Zelensky met with Trump in September, and according to an anonymous source, Trump seemed genuinely interested in learning more about the situation.
A source in Ukraine who spoke under condition of anonymity to discuss the September meeting said Trump asked genuine questions about the war and Zelensky’s victory plan, which includes a path to beating Russia by inviting Kyiv into NATO, lifting U.S. weapons restrictions and providing the nation with a nonnuclear strategic deterrent capability.
However, according to the same source, Trump also expects concessions from Ukraine—the country that was ruthlessly attacked by the Russians, whose civilians are being raped, tortured, and murdered, whose critical civilian infrastructure is being intentionally targeted by Moscow, and whose territories Russia has illegally annexed.
Given the uncertainty, Reuters reports today that the Biden administration is rushing billions in aid to Ukraine before Trump is inaugurated in January.
The U.S. will continue to send munitions and anti-tank weapons such as the Lockheed Martin and RTX Javelin to Ukraine in the coming months.
In order to help Ukraine retake its territory in its ground war with Russia, more ground vehicles will be needed, as well as 155mm artillery made by General Dynamics Corp. Ukraine should be receiving more GMLRS surface-to-surface rockets, which have been under heavy use by the HIMARS multiple rocket launch system.
There’s been no reporting about whether the Biden administration will finally untie Ukraine’s hands and allow the beseiged nation to attack targets inside Russia. As I wrote last week, what good is providing weapons systems to Ukraine, if they’re not allowed to target the aggressor?
The Biden administration has been the major obstacle to allowing Ukraine to defend its territory and its people. Given the lack of certainty in the new administration, Biden needs to untie Ukraine’s hands and allow it to use western weapons to stop Russia for good.
Will Trump allow Ukraine to use its resources on targets inside Russia? Hard to say. Trump appreciates strength, and allowing Ukraine to finally use the weapons systems it got from the West to strike Russian military targets would definitely be a show of strength.
But on the other hand, Trump and VP-elect JD Vance claim Russia is not our enemy, and they may act to protect Moscow.
So Biden needs to act now. Otherwise, he will become the US President who not only lost Afghanistan to the Taliban but who allowed Russia to gobble up Ukraine and threaten the rest of Europe.
You know that even though I’m a Republican I have always strongly supported Ukraine.
But since foreign policy is not my bailiwick or any part of my education, I try to read from people much smarter than me.
Despite the bluster from Trump, from JD “I don’t care about Ukraine” Vance, and nimrods like MTG, there’s a lot more to unpack about Ukraine.
For starters, a piece by Eli Lake in The Free Press called “Trump and the Art of the Bullshitter” reinforced what I had suspected: don’t listen to the bullshit he throws out to his base. Don’t take him literally, as the media does. See what he does.
So more from the Really Smart People.
Sir Niall Ferguson, conservative British historian and author (also married to Ayaan Hirsi-Ali) who wrote in The Free Press:
“The conventional wisdom in Trump’s foreign policy will also turn out to be wrong, I predict. The error is to think of the Trump-Vance administration as isolationist and therefore indifferent to the fate of Ukraine and other embattled democracies.
Harris would mostly have continued Biden’s foreign policy, except that she would have been even more dovish on Iran. That would have been bad for Israel and disastrous for Ukraine—which was destined for defeat if the West’s present policy of too-little-too-late had continued. … Yes, Trump has repeatedly said he wants to end the Russia-Ukraine war. But what we don’t yet know is whether he’ll do this by throwing the Ukrainians to the Russian wolves, as Tucker Carlson recommends, or by exerting greater military pressure on Russia, as Tom Cotton, Robert O’Brien, and Mike Pompeo recommend. My bet is on the latter.
Why? Because Trump and Vance, as well as House Speaker Mike Johnson, now understand that the United States faces a real axis of authoritarian powers—China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. They understand that a win for Vladimir Putin in Ukraine would also be a win for Xi Jinping, Ali Khamenei, and Kim Jong Un. And they understand that, in the new Cold War we find ourselves fighting, only by reestablishing deterrence can the risk of World War III be averted.”
Owen Matthews of the UK Spectator, who has written extensively on Russia (and whose mother was from Kharkiv):
“Donald Trump’s election victory heralds the beginning of the end of the Ukraine war — and is likely to leave Vladimir Putin in control of most, if not all, of the territory he has seized in nearly three years of bloody conflict. To many Ukrainians, such an outcome will be a betrayal of their struggle, a stab in the back by the West that will sow decades of anger and resentment. To others, though, a swift end to the conflict before more land is lost and tens of thousands more young Ukrainians die represents the best hope of actually salvaging a decent future for their country before their infrastructure, economy, and an entire generation are annihilated completely ….
But …
“Trump’s plan is to push Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate by threatening to open the aid spigots for Ukraine — while also pressing Zelensky to the table by threatening to withhold aid. And many of the people tipped for Trump’s cabinet are strong Russia hawks, not appeasers. Both former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, a possible defense secretary, and former national-security adviser Robert O’Brien, tipped for secretary of state, have criticized the Biden administration for restricting the use of US weapons and called for more sanctions on Russia. Indeed, Pompeo has backed creating a $500 billion lend-lease program to help Ukraine defend itself and also supports giving the country Nato membership — though O’Brien said last month that would be “too provocative at this point.”
Owens also pointed out that “the Biden administration has effectively ignored Zelensky’s October peace plan, dialed down aid from $60 billion to $7.9 billion, and much of that non-lethal, and crucially refused to allow the Ukrainians to use long-range Western-supplied missiles to hit targets inside Russia.”
A Harris administration would have continued the same slow-walk strategy indefinitely.
Finally, from Charles Lipson, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Chicago. He’s conservative but supports Ukraine:
“First, it is worth remembering that Trump lacks the power to impose a peace settlement on Ukraine, which has fought tenaciously to regain its territory. Yes, the US and its European partners can threaten to withhold weapons, ammunition and intelligence assets. That will get the warring parties to the table, but it will not ensure a stable peace if it leaves Putin’s regime in control of Ukrainian territory. They will want to retake it. He will want to expand from that base.”
So … bottom line for me is that while I don’t like Trump and have never liked him — hell, I never saw one episode of “The Apprentice” — I have become cautiously optimistic about Ukraine with his election. I firmly believe that he will definitely be a stronger supporter of Israel (Harris wouldn’t even name the Jewish Josh Shapiro as her running mate, for crying out loud).
Plus, as someone with a son-in-law in command of a submarine crew that is currently underway as I write this, I’m especially supportive of “peace through strength.” We now have a weak-kneed president who is on his way out, thankfully. Trump is no Reagan. But he can become a deterrent, which, as Ferguson said in a speech he gave in Australia prior to the election, is the most impactful aspect of foreign policy in an increasingly dangerous world.
Fingers crossed as we wait Inauguration Day and beyond.