Teixeira Stolen Documents

How Damaging Are They?

Courtesy of TayebMEZAHDIA on Pixabay

While I took a break from writing, the world apparently turned upside down with yet another massive leak of classified information.

The theft of classified documents is a subject that angers me beyond all reason, having previously worked in the intelligence community, and having seen the kind of damage in which these disclosures can result. I’m containing my rage here to write a coherent article on why these disclosures are dangerous for our policy and national security, as well as for possible assets that could be endangered by these releases.

The information itself may not be the main issue. These disclosures could expose our sources and methods, revealing to our enemies how and where we get our intercepts, resulting in the loss of those resources, and who our assets may be and where they may be placed. The leaks can reveal the location of sensitive sources, endanger them and their families, and impact morale and the trust and confidence our partners have in our ability to safeguard sensitive information, impacting intelligence-sharing.

When thousands of suspicious activities reports were released in the FinCEN Files by a disgruntled former FinCEN employee, the world’s attention was immediately drawn to the billions of dollars in financial transactions that were allowed to slip through the cracks by a “broken” US enforcement system. There was nothing surprising in those releases, save for the WHO and HOW MUCH.

My attention was drawn more to the fact that intelligence-sharing could be impacted by our inability to keep sensitive information out of the public space.

When disgruntled Army Private then-Bradley (now-Chelsea) Manning released hundreds of thousands of classified records to WikiLeaks, the identities of at least 100 Afghans who were cooperating with coalition forces were exposed, including in some cases, the names of their villages, and family members, as well as GPS coordinates indicating where they could be found.

The Taliban announced that those exposed in Manning’s callous release would be found and punished.

When the traitor Edward Snowden released millions of signals intelligence records before eventually fleeing to Russia to hang with his handlers (I’ve always believed, and still do, that Snowden was a Russian asset), our SIGINT resources were compromised globally, and according to US officials, Snowden endangered US personnel and facilities, damaged intelligence collection efforts, exposed collection sources and methods, destabilized our relationships with partners and allies, and exposed operations, capabilities and priorities.

But back to Jack Teixeira, who is accused of stealing classified intelligence and releasing it to his group of gamer friends on Discord, which subsequently allowed the sensitive information to be picked up by Russian Telegram channels and others.

Teixeira is a 21-year-old Massachusetts Air National Guardsman, who faces two criminal counts (for now): unauthorized retention and transmission of national defense information and the unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or material.

Teixeira since May 2022 worked in the 102nd Intelligence Wing at Otis Air Force Base in Cape Cod, and his stepfather and stepbrother worked at the same military base. Teixeira was an IT specialist in the Air Guard, and his unit, according to media reports, provides intelligence support to units worldwide.

Teixeira did not have a criminal record or anything else that prevented him from getting a Top Secret clearance in 2021. Many have been publicly screaming about a 21-year old getting access to classified information and to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), on which classified information and assessments are stored and transmitted. But fact is, that his age does not matter. His background check came back clean enough to get a clearance, and his job as an IT specialist—if he was an IT specialist working on classified systems—would have granted him access to JWICS.

His age has nothing to do with anything. Thousands of military members get a Top Secret clearance, work as intelligence specialists, deploy with those clearances and have access to sensitive information that allows them to do their job on the battlefield and in tactical operations centers (TOCs). The majority of them do not leak sensitive information. They know that they sign agreements to safeguard classified information. They sign documentation, confirming they understand the importance of the intelligence to which they gain access and read multiple documents, receive multiple initial and annual training, and watch multiple videos underscoring the importance of the information they are to safeguard. They are aware that unauthorized disclosures could lead to criminal charges and they sign nondisclosure agreements that state just that.

If they’re too stupid or undisciplined to understand what they signed, they’re too stupid and undisciplined to be granted access to firearms and be allowed on the battlefield.

Their brains are not underdeveloped. As a friend of mine recently so astutely pointed out, it’s not about impulse control.

Every single day 21-year-olds are arrested for public intoxication, public urination, misdemeanor assaults, statutory rapes, and more. This is because we as a society have decided at 21 you're responsible for knowing you don't piss on somebody's house, you don't nail 16-year-olds, and you don't hit people.

Add to that list: don't steal national security documents, remove them from the SCIF, and spend hours retyping them into Discord to impress a bunch of teenage chumps who never asked you to do that shit and were so apathetic to it you had to yell at them to pay attention or you'd stop violating the Espionage Act.

If it's reasonable to expect young people to understand "don't whiz on a fire hydrant", it's reasonable to expect them to understand "and don't do the shit Teixeira did".

Generally, those who leak classified information or spy on foreign powers, do so for four reasons: money, ideology, coercion, and ego. There’s an acronym (just like in everything else in government): MICE. These are the most common factors, and I’d say that with gay and transgender people openly serving in sensitive roles these days, a major coercion factor has been removed. Yes, there are instances where kompromat - compromising information - can prompt someone to spy for a foreign power, but I think generally, the first three are the most common these days.

I have seen no information to suggest that Teixeira actively spied on his country. He didn’t directly provide classified information to foreign handlers, and he did not intentionally steal classified documents in order to do so. The reporting I have seen suggests that ego was his main motivator.

Teixeira began releasing classified information as early as December. He would copy blocks of text from information he stole from work. If I had to make an educated guess, I’d say he printed it out on classified printers from the JWICS system and took it home. He then posted the information on a private Discord channel for his gaming buddies.

After a while, Teixeira got nervous about typing out the information he was divulging, which indicates he absolutely knew that what he was doing was wrong, and began taking photographs with his phone and posting them in the Discord chat. As a matter of fact, he explained to another user that he was concerned that he would get in trouble for "making the transcriptions of text in the workplace," so he began taking the documents to his residence and photographing them.

He knew what he was doing was illegal, and he did it anyway.

I judge, based on available reporting, that Teixeira got frustrated that the gamer kids in his group were more interested in gaming and YouTube videos than they were in his flaccid attempts to look important, showing off what kind of secret stuff he knew. He apparently expected these kids to read closely the reports he disclosed and got angry when they began to ignore him.

Late last year, a peeved OG [Teixeira’s online moniker] fired off a message to all the members of the server. He had spent nearly an hour every day writing up “these long and drawn-out posts in which he’d often add annotations and explanations for stuff that we normal citizens would not understand,” the member said. His would-be pupils were more interested in YouTube videos about battle gear.

“He got upset, and he said on multiple occasions, if you guys aren’t going to interact with them, I’m going to stop sending them.”

That’s right. If you kids don’t pay attention to me, I’m going to stop violating the law and sending you classified information!

It seems like Teixeira got tired of typing out classified information with no awed gratitude from his pals, so he began simply photographing the documents - classification markings and all - and posting them on the server. The photos included the status of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, including troop movements on a particular date.

Some featured detailed charts of battlefield conditions in Ukraine and highly classified satellite images of the aftermath of Russian missile strikes on Ukrainian electrical facilities. Others sketched the potential trajectory of North Korean ballistic nuclear missiles that could reach the United States. Another featured photographs of the Chinese spy balloon that floated across the country in February, snapped from eye-level, probably by a U-2 spy plane, along with a diagram of the balloon and the surveillance technology attached to it.

In response to this latest fiasco, the White House has instructed Pentagon officials to evaluate why Teixeira had access to these documents in the first place. Others in the media and former officials posed those questions as well.

President Biden, in a statement on Friday, said he had “directed our military and intelligence community to take steps to further secure and limit distribution of sensitive information.”

Later, while speaking to reporters in Ireland, Mr. Biden added that he instructed officials to “make sure that they get to the root of why he had access in the first place, number one, and number two to focus extensively on the extent to which it all occurred.” Of the probe, he added, “I don’t think it’s going to take very long.”

He had the access because his background check came back clean and because it was part of his job. That’s it. Nothing more. He didn’t have financial difficulties. He didn’t have ideological views that caused him to betray his country. He, by all accounts, was a normal kid—until he wasn’t.

What, exactly, is the Pentagon supposed to do?

Will they put an age limit on those who can access JWICS?

Will they bar those below a certain military rank from accessing classified information?

Will they examine if there was anything in the background check that should have come back as prohibitive?

It seems a bit ridiculous to limit potentially skilled, intelligent analysts and military members from accessing classified information merely because of their age or their rank because an egomaniacal, desperate-for-attention Airman decided that his ego and adulation from his peers was more important than the national security information he swore to safeguard.

Also, this twerp was not a whistleblower. He did not expose information about wrongdoing, he did not take perceived wrongdoing to the proper channels, and he did not approach the media when those channels failed him, not that such a leak of sensitive intelligence to the media would have been justified.

No.

He stole information to appear cool to his gaming buddies. Period.

And finally a word about media outlets that gleefully publish the classified information contained in these disclosures. The information is out there, that’s true. But it’s still classified. No one declassified it, and the more it’s publicized in those reports, the worse the situation becomes.

The Washington Post is particularly gleefully publishing numerous reports about what is contained in those disclosures.

They discuss a number of other Chinese spy balloons that contained sensitive surveillance technologies.

They report on weaknesses in Taiwan’s air defenses.

They discuss Russian disinformation methods.

They expose the fact that the United States had resources that allowed it to spy on Mexican cartels.

Sure the documents are available, but why make it easy?

This is a case of not whether you can publish, but whether you should.

Geraldo Rivera was very publicly booted from Iraq after broadcasting future troop movements.

New York Times reporter Michael Moss in 2005 published a story on deficiencies in ceramic plates in ballistic vests worn by personnel in Iraq that made them vulnerable to certain munitions used by insurgents.

Why give anyone with Internet access this critical information? Why make it easy? Sure they may have done some digging and found the information anyway, but serving it up to them on a silver platter just gives our enemies an easy resource.

I do hope they throw the book at Teixeira, primarily because he deserves it, and also as a message to other pathetic little worms who think that national security is a game.