President Trump this week announced a plan to lift sanctions on Syria. The announcement comes following last year’s fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and his subsequent escape to Russia. Trump claims the sanctions relief will give Syria “a chance at greatness.”
There are several issues that should be addressed before sanctions are completely lifted against Syria. This is my opinion only, so take it for what it is.
Terrorism
Drugs/Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)
Russia
Human rights
Terrorism.
The Assad regime collapsed late last year after a major offensive by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who has since changed his name from that nom de guerre to Ahmed al-Sharaa.
HTS is still a designated terrorist group. The National Counterterrorism Center guide lists the group as a “coalition of northern Syria-based Sunni Islamist insurgent groups that evolved from Jabhat al-Nusrah, or “Nusrah Front,” al-Qa‘ida’s former branch in Syria.”
Jawlani (now Sharaa) broke with al-Qa‘ida in 2016, and the Nusrah Front in 2017 merged with other anti-regime groups in northwestern Syria to form HTS.
There’s a whole tangled terrorism history there, including HTS defectors who remained loyal to al-Qa‘ida forming the al-Qa‘ida branch in Syria, known as Hurras al-Din in 2018.
Sharaa is still a sanctioned terrorist, although the United States in December dropped its $10 million reward for his arrest.
OFAC in early January in response to the fall of Assad also issued Syria General License (GL) 24 to expand authorizations for activities and transactions in Syria.
Given the extraordinary circumstances, and to support the Syrian people as they build a more hopeful, secure, and peaceful future, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, through OFAC, is issuing GL 24 to help ensure that sanctions do not impede essential services and continuity of governance functions across Syria, including the provision of electricity, energy, water, and sanitation. GL 24 builds on existing authorizations in the Syrian Sanctions Regulations, Global Terrorist Sanctions Regulations, and Foreign Terrorist Organization Sanctions Regulations, including those that support international organization activities, nongovernmental organization (NGO) activities, humanitarian, and stabilization efforts in the region.
The Biden administration took a cautious and gradual approach to Syria sanctions relief, highlighting that GL 24 does not unblock the property or interest in property of any blocked person under any US sanctions programs, including Assad and his associates, the Government of Syria, Central Bank of Syria, or HTS. OFAC also noted that the GL doesn’t authorize any financial transfers to any blocked person other than for the purpose of effecting certain authorized payments to governing institutions or associated service providers in Syria.
According to OFAC, US persons can send noncommercial, personal remittances to friends or family in Syria, provided the transfer is not by, to, or through the Government of Syria or any other person whose property and interests in property are blocked. GL24 authorizes transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to processing the transfer of noncommercial, personal remittances to Syria, including through the Central Bank of Syria, provided that the recipient is not blocked.
Terrorism can still be an issue in Syria, despite Sharaa’s public split with al-Qa‘ida. The current GL expires in July, and the Trump administration should evaluate extending its provisions then.
Drugs and TCOs.
Under Assad, Syria became a narco-state. The Assad regime and its allies trafficked the amphetamine Captagon 1) for profit, and 2) to pressure the Gulf states, notably Saudi Arabia, to reintegrate Syria into the Arab world, according to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Nicknamed “the drug of jihad” or “the poor man’s cocaine,” Captagon enhances focus and staves off sleep and hunger, partly explaining its popularity among combatants, who need to stay alert. However, it also has the potential to cause confusion and hallucinations, affecting impulse control and judgment.
Transnational criminal organizations smuggle Captagon in numerous ways. One of the most insidious and inventive methodologies I’ve read about has been the concealment of the drug to look like pottery.
Syrian authorities have announced that they have seized 24kg of Captagon that had been crushed and reconstituted to look like hummus bowls.
The amphetamine is produced in pill form but smugglers had crushed it and used the resulting paste to “mould pottery-like dishes coated with a brown adhesive”, the interior ministry said.
Watch the video in this link to see how crazy this is.
Assad’s regime actively cooperated with transnational organized crime groups, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) reported.
Financed by Captagon production and other forms of organized crime, such as human and cigarette smuggling, antiquities theft, and the arms trade, Assad’s tenure has spread violence, drugs, and corruption throughout the region. A 2023 OCCRP investigation with BBC News Arabic, Suwayda24.com, and Daraj.com into the Captagon trade showed how Syria’s descent into a narco-state pitted Assad’s drug traffickers against security forces in Jordan and Lebanon.
These activities are a threat not just to the region but also to Europe. Bloomberg reported in 2023 that designated Iran-backed groups such as Hizballah and Assad were looking for new markets for Captagon in Europe.
Jordan in 2023 killed Syrian drug trafficker Marai al-Ramthan and his family in strikes against a drug factory. Al-Ramthan’s factory was a warehouse for smuggled weapons transiting through a network controlled by the Assad regime, Iran, and Hizballah, according to a report by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs, citing western sources.
So, before lifting sanctions, the Trump administration should ensure that 1) the designations against Assad remain and 2) that Syria does not revert to being a narco state that generates revenue for corrupt leaders.
Russia.
Russia is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world right now. Sheer numbers show more than 21,000 designations of individuals, entities, aircraft, and vessels that are linked to Russia, and Moscow’s relationship with Assad is a risk, especially since Moscow has granted Assad asylum after he fled Syria last year.
Russia and Syria have had close historical ties since the 1940s. After the fall of Assad, Russia kept its naval resupply facility in Tartus, that was opened in the 1970s. Military facilities in Syria help Russia resupply its Wagner forces, among other critical functions. Russia in 2012, with Chinese backing, vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Assad’s attacks on civilians in Homs. The two countries have been more than a little snuggly, and Russia has been a major supporter of Assad and has murdered numerous civilians in the country.
Sharaa in February had a phone call with Russian president Putin—his first contact with a Syrian head of state since Assad fled to Russia. Sharaa highlighted “the strong strategic ties between the two countries and Syria’s openness to all parties” in a way that serves “the interests of the Syrian people and strengthens Syria’s stability and security.” The continued presence and involvement of Russia in Syria is a problem, especially because of Russia’s continued support for Wagner and the possible use of facilities in the country to support the designated group.
The US government has been well aware of the risks of the relationship between the two countries, and the first Trump administration in 2014 designated one entity, three individuals, and five vessels facilitating the delivery of jet fuel to Russian forces operating in Syria in violation of US sanctions.
Russia and Iran also have delivered oil to the Syrian government by using Promsyrioimport—a subsidiary of the Russian Energy Ministry. Sanctions evasion may continue as an area of cooperation between Russia and Iran in Syria as sanctions on Moscow, Tehran, and Damascus persist, intensified by the Caesar Act. Unfortunately, US enforcement of the Caesar Act has been anything but effective.
The Syrian Legal Development Programme in January 2022 cited a Global Witness report revealing the extent of Assad’s money network in Russia, exposing banks and companies in Cyprus, the British Virgin Islands and Russia that helped sanctioned individuals and entities, including the Syrian Scientific Research Centre (SSRC)—responsible for Syria’s chemical weapons program—evade sanctions. The report details Assad’s money network and its connection to Russia, including Russian intelligence services.
I would hope that President Trump’s advisors recommend caution.
Human rights.
Human rights are still a challenge in Syria as the country struggles to recover from years of Assad authoritarianism. Human Rights Watch reports that Syrian National Army (SNA) factions that fought the Assad regime “continue to detain, mistreat, and extort civilians in northern Syria.”
Unfortunately, these SNA fighters are actually being integrated into the Syrian armed forces, and their commanders are being promoted to high-level positions.
Among the commanders involved in past abuses and who now hold influential posts in the new Syrian military are Mohammad al-Jassem (Abu Amsha) leading the 62nd Division; Saif Boulad (Saif Abu Bakr) leading the 76th Division; Fehim Isa as the defense minister’s assistant for northern affairs; and most recently, Ahmed al-Hais (Abu Hatem Shaqra) leading the 86th Division in the eastern region.
Human Rights Watch also reported a few days ago that the Syrian transitional government is hindering the ability of aid groups to provide much-needed assistance because of bureaucratic and administrative roadblocks. Meanwhile, Syrian civilians continue to suffer.
Sectarian clashes continue in Syria, and as of this month, more than 100 people have died, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The AFP reported a few weeks ago that violence between members of Syria’s Druze community and gunmen linked to the national authorities highlight how members of the minority group are increasingly faced with a precarious choice: loyalty to Syria or forming a new alliance with Israel.
These issues need to be resolved before comprehensive sanctions relief is provided. A general license will allow the US administration to monitor the progress Syria is making under Sharaa and make informed decisions about permanent sanctions relief.
Caution. Always caution.
I wrote in 2023 with K2 Integrity’s Amir Fadavi an overview and assessment of the general licenses issued in response to an agreement between Venezuela’s Unitary Platform and representatives of President Nicolás Maduro that created a roadmap for democratic elections in the country.
The licenses included temporary authorizations for previously prohibited transactions involving Venezuela’s state-owned oil company PdVSA or its majority owned subsidiaries that are related to oil or gas sector operations in Venezuela. They also authorized certain activities related to the Venezuelan gold sector, authorized certain activities with respect to certain debt and securities that were targeted under the US Venezuela sanctions program, and authorized certain transactions with Venezuelan designated Conviasa airline.
The licenses could be snapped back or simply allowed to expire if Maduro violated the commitments under the roadmap. We advised at the time that those who intended to use the general licenses had to ensure they have proper controls in place in case snapback occurs.
In fact, that’s exactly what happened, and the United States in April 2024 reversed its sanctions relief in response.
The same types of licenses could be applied in the case of Syria. Instead of ending all sanctions on Syria at once, the Trump administration should exercise caution. Sanctions aren’t meant to be permanent, but the Sharaa government must demonstrate change in order to earn sanctions relief.
Syria is designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, so pronounced progress in tossing terrorist groups out of the country, would help remove that designation. US forces in February eliminated Muhammed Yusuf Ziya Talay, the senior military leader of the Hurras al-Din. ISIS is also still hanging around in Syria, as is Ansar al-Islam, which maintains links to al-Qa‘ida and has also pledged allegiance to ISIS.
Sanctions relief should be linked to efforts to eliminate terrorist groups in the country.
Syria’s interim government should make sure that Russia’s influence does not again take hold in the country, that drug traffickers and TCOs are arrested and prosecuted, and that human rights are protected.
General licenses can always be extended if progress is made, and although financial institutions and other organizations will still have a low appetite for risk in Syria, the more progress is made, the more likely they are to do business in the country.
Yanking all sanctions at once will be complicated—especially given how long some of these sanctions programs have been in place—and if the Sharaa government slides backwards, imposing sanctions again will not be easy.
Take a look at Sudan, which was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993. The determination regarding Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism was rescinded on December 14, 2020 after a popular uprising led to the ouster of the Islamist government of Omar al-Bashir.
The leadership who replaced him promised a new era for the country. Getting off the State Sponsor of Terrorism list became a priority, not just because it would allow Sudan to rejoin the international community, but because it would provide opportunities to escape a deep economic crisis.
But in May 2023, President Biden imposed new sanctions on Sudan pursuant to Executive Order 14098, targeting those who threaten Sudan's peace, security, stability, or democratic transition, engage in human rights abuses, or obstruct humanitarian assistance.
Although the country is no longer designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, backsliding on other issues can and does happen. The risks still exist. The Biden administration in 2022 issued an advisory highlighting growing risks to US businesses and individuals that transact with Sudanese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), which includes all companies under military control.
Investing with, forming partnerships, or facilitating the expansion of SOEs and military-controlled companies in Sudan may entail reputational risks for U.S. businesses and individuals. Any financial or technical assistance provided by U.S. companies to the military and/or the network of companies that it controls risks the potential association with human rights abuses and with actors impeding the country’s democratic transformation. Given these considerations, the U.S. government notes that engagement with SOEs and military-controlled companies could harm companies’ reputations in Sudan, as well as their reputations with shareholders, employees, and civil society.
Syria needs to be monitored closely as it continues to transition from years of Assad’s authoritarian rule. Ergo, it would behoove the administration to take a gradual approach to sanctions relief for Syria.
“I am very inclined to support sanctions relief for Syria under the right conditions. However, we must remember that the current leadership in Syria achieved its position through force of arms, not through the will of its people.” - Lindsay Graham (R-SC)